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REPLY BRIEF
I. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY REJECTING PETITIONER'S LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT
THE RETIRMENT INTERESTS BECAME TRANSMUTTED.
The Respondent responded to the Petitioner's argument regarding transmutation
in a cavalier manner without addressing the merits of her argument. (See Respondent's
Brief, page 29). The Petitioner's argument below, as it is on appeal, is that a court, in
valuing and dividing marital assets, should adopt a legal theory that avoids speculation
and assures fairness and accuracy. (See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, p. 29). Here, the
Petitioner advocated the straight-forward valuation approach already approved by Utah's
appellate courts of simply deducting the premarital values identified by PacifiCorp's
Retirement Plans on Trial Exhibit P-4 from the values that existed on the date of trial.
This approach would have been far more accurate and fair than the adoption of the Smith
Model, a new theory advocated by Respondent, that was replete with problems from the
very beginning. The trial court expressed openly on the record "that there isn't really any
case law out there to guide me clearly" and that this case appeared to it to be one of "first
impression." (Transcript, p. 343). The trial court admittedly struggled with which legal
theory to apply.
For obvious reasons, the Respondent did not address any of the five undisputed
events that caused transmutation in this case, as identified on pages 30-31 of Appellant's
Brief on Appeal. Instead, the Respondent argued that the trial court expressly found that
the "funds were separately identifiable." (See Respondent's Brief, p. 29). Such is not
true and the Respondent's citation to the transcript, p. 228, actually supports the
5

Petitioner's position regarding transmutation. In fact, the trial court glossed over the
Petitioner's transmutation argument in its zeal to adopt the Smith Model and divide the
IRA accounts based upon equal years of service. In doing so, the trial court ignored the
five transmutation events described in the Appellant's Brief. By adopting the Smith
Model, the trial court ignored the fact (despite its own finding) that the overwhelming
growth in the retirement interests, or $447,964.18, occurred during the parties' marriage.
It ignored the fact that $116,889.66 (roughly one-fourth) occurred in 2001 when the
parties agreed to PacifiCorp's WTRP and retire early with enhanced benefits. The trial
court ignored the fact that all retirement interests were cashed out and rolled over into
IRA accounts and existed four years prior to the divorce in this case. It ignored the fact
that transmutation occurred by the multitudinous withdraws by the Respondent in
violation of the court's own order.
The Petitioner's point is very simple. In determining what legal approach to use
to value premarital and marital interests, as the court must do, why use a new legal theory
to value and divide marital assets that is diseased from the start? Why use a new legal
theory to value and divide marital assets that cannot possibly account for the events of
transmutation at all? Why use any model that must by necessity contain a myriad of
problematical mathematical assumptions, as did the Smith Model?
Instead, why not use a straight-forward valuation approach, already approved by
Utah courts, that employs the actual figures and takes into consideration all of the events
of transmutation? Clearly, the Respondent understood this dilemma and chose not to
respond to Petitioner's transmutation argument at all.
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY ADOPTING THE SMITH MODEL
OF DIVIDING THE PARTIES' IRA ACCOUNTS.
The legal decision concerning which legal theory to adopt for the purpose of
valuing and dividing the parties' IRA accounts was a significant legal decision. On the
one hand, using the straight-forward valuation approach advocated by the Petitioner, the
Petitioner should have been awarded one-half of the increase accrued during marriage or
the sum of $223,982.18. On the other hand, using the Smith Model advocated by the
Respondent, and spreading out the growth of the funds over 31.90 years, the Petitioner
was only awarded the sum of $66,274.60 and deprived of the contributions and growth
that occurred during the marriage. Contrary to the Respondent's argument, this decision
was a legal decision and not a factual decision. (Transcript, p. 81, 343, 765). Questions
of law are reviewed for correctness. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 90 P.3d 348 (Ut. App. 1994).
The Respondent advocated the Smith Model, or a coverture fraction, to value and
divide the IRA accounts, for an obvious reason. It awarded him a disproportionate
amount of the marital estate. By spreading out the large increase in value through
contributions and growth that occurred during the marriage, or $447,964.18, over a
period of 30.9 years, the Petitioner was deprived of her right to receive marital property
accrued during the marriage and appreciation on that marital property as directed by the
court in Dunn v. Dunn, 803 P.2d 1314 (Ut. App. 1990) and Englert v. Englert 576 P.2d
1274 (Ut. 1978). The Respondent offers no rationale to justify this inequitable result.
The absurdity of applying a coverture fraction to this case is illustrated by the
testimony of Respondent's own expert, Roger Smith. Mr. Smith testified that, using his
7

coverture model, he fixed the value of Respondent's premarital interest as of 2/13/93 in
the DCP at $119,234.26 and the Basic at $168,475.49, for a total of $278,709.75.
(Defendant's Exhibit 3, page 1, or Addendum E to Appellant's Breif on Appeal).
Compare these figures with the values placed on Respondent's interests by PacifiCorp as
of 2/13/93, or $67,994.24 for the DCP and $46,148.94 for the Basic, for a total of
$114,143.18. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 or Addendum C to Appellant's Brief on Appeal).
When asked if he thought PacifiCorp would have given the Respondent the amount of
money Mr. Smith identified as Respondent's premarital interests, had Respondent
separated from the company on 2/13/93, he admitted that PacifiCorp would not have
done so. (Testimony of Roger Smith, p. 235).
The Respondent urges this Court to apply Woodward to the facts of this case. In
doing so, Respondent misses the mark. Woodward was a case involving future undefined
interests—interests that had yet to be accrued or determined in a defined benefit plan.
The Utah Supreme Court properly determined that future undefined interests, those that
accrue post divorce, may be divided by the application of the coverture fraction. But this
case does not involve future undefined interests. All of the retirement interests in this
case had already been reduced to sums certain and placed in IRA accounts that were
created four (4) years preceding the divorce in this case. The sole issue for the trial court
was to identify the values of the premarital interests from marital interests and divide
them. Using a coverture fraction to value the parties' interests in this case (both
premarital and marital) by the trial court was improper. To the best of Petitioner's
research, all courts that have considered this question have found a clear abuse of
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discretion where a trial court employed a coverture fraction to value martial assets
already accrued. The Respondent's attempts to distinguish Mann v. Mann, 470 S.E. 2d
605 (Va. App. 1996); Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W. 2d 140 (Tex. App. Houston 2000); In Re
Hester, 856 P.2d 1048 (Or. App. 1991); Tanghe v. Tanghe, 115 P.3d 567 (Ak. 2005) and
Paulone v. Paulone, 649 A.2d 691 (Pa. Super. 1994) are clearly disingenuous. The
principle of law enunciated in each of these cases, that coverture fractions may only be
used to divide future undefined interests, and not value past accrued interests, applies
fundamentally to the facts of this case and it was clear error for the trial court to use a
coverture fraction in this case.
The Respondent attempts to undermine the fact that his premarital interests in his
DCP and Basic Plan were only $67,994.24 and $46,148.94, respectively, as shown on
Petitioner's Exhibit 4. (Addendum C to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). In essence, the
Respondent's argument is that Exhibit P-4 did not represent the "true value" of his
premarital interests because Respondent could not have retired then and was required to
work additional years before the total value of his retirement plans would become
manifest. (Respondent's Brief, p. 26). This argument does not hold true factually or
legally. Factually, the Respondent's argument fails because the Respondent's own expert
testified that the figures represented by Petitioner's Exhibit P-4 is all that Respondent
would have received had he separated from PacifiCorp on 2/13/93. (Testimony of Roger
Smith, Transcript, p. 231). Mr. Smith also testified that Exhibit P-5 represents the value
of the two accounts had the Respondent retired on 2/13/93. (Testimony of Roger Smith,
Transcript, p. 251). Therefore, Exhibit P-4 clearly represents "true value" or fair market
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value. The fact that PacifiCorp's retirement plans provided greater benefits for longer
service during the marital years after 2/13/93 does not assist the Respondent in his
argument. These events occurred during the marital years and must be considered part of
the marital estate. Moreover, most retirement plans, including PacifiCorp's, contain
formulae that reward workers having longevity as they approach retirement age, and
therefore such is a fact without any distinction.
In the Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pages 37-42, the Petitioner described flaws in
the Smith Model, assuming a coverture fraction could be used to value past accrued
premarital and marital interests. She had also pointed out the flaws in the Smith Model to
the trial court. Recognizing that the Smith Model had these flaws, the trial court made
"equitable adjustments" which the Petitioner claimed was illusory.
The Respondent, in his cross-appeal, has appealed the trial court's decision
regarding these alleged equitable adjustments. Because the Respondent has the burden of
proof on these issues, the Petitioner will address the Respondent's arguments in her
Answering Brief, below.
III. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO
A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR
TRIAL BELOW AS WELL AS ON APPEAL.
The Respondent did not address the Petitioner's primary argument that the trial
court erred by awarding the Petitioner only limited fees because the parties could not
agree on any issue to be decided by the court. Also, the Respondent did not address the
Petitioner's primary request that fees be awarded on appeal if successful. Instead, the
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Respondent argues an entirely different point. The Respondent argues the trial court
erred in awarding any attorney's fees below.
Therefore, presumptively, the Respondent does not quarrel with the Petitioner's
primary claims on appeal and admits that the trial court erred in awarding limited fees, if
any fees were warranted, and admits that additional fees should be awarded on appeal if
the Petitioner is successful. Since the Respondent has the burden of proof on whether the
trial court erred in awarding any fees, the Petitioner will address the Respondent's
argument in her Answering Brief below.
PETITIONER'S ANSWERING BRIEF
I. THE TRIAL COURT COURT'S DECISION
REGARDING THE DCP WAS CORRECT BUT ILLUSORY.
Having adopted the Smith Model, the trial court recognized that it was fraught
with problems nevertheless. In short, the Smith Model used a "modified" coverture
fraction and did not include the total length of the marriage as a denominator, did not
allocate the enhanced years of service awarded in the WFTP equally to the nominator and
denominator, did not account for the fact the greatest wealth was created during the
marriage, and failed to distinguish between active and passive appreciation. These were
issues that were discussed in dept during both off-record discussions (see Transcript, p.
731, 767, 769) as well as during on-record discussion. (Transcript, p. 769, 770-775).
In an effort to ameliorate the defects in the Smith Model, the trial court made
certain decisions on disputed issues that it called "equitable adjustments" implying that it
was ruling in favor of the Petitioner on the disputed issues in order to overcome the
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defects in the Smith Model. (See Findings of Fact, No. 15 and 31). One such dispute
involved the proper interpretation of the DCP Plan.
The DCP is described at pages 9-10 and 38-39 of Appellant's Brief on Appeal. It
is found in Exhibit R-13, pages 47-52, and is referred to as "Restated Appendix D to
PacifiCorp Retirement Plan." Below, the Respondent initially admitted that the DCP was
a marital asset, but changed his position on the first day of trial. (Transcript, p. 79). The
Respondent's new argument was that the DCP plan document showed that the benefits
were frozen prior to the parties' marriage and therefore was entirely premarital.
However, the Respondent's argument was premised upon an erroneous and incomplete
reading of the DCP plan documents. The plan itself did not "freeze" benefit levels as
suggested by the Respondent.1 In fact, instead of calculating benefit levels based upon
the employee's highest annual base salary at the time of retirement, the benefit level was
based upon (A) the employee's highest annual base salary as of 1/1/90, and (B) certain
specified enhancements based upon increases in salary between 1/1/90 and 12/31/93
called "Earnings Classes", and other factors. (See ^ 4.5 of the DCP. Moreover, an
employee is nevertheless required to continue to work and put in years of service and be
at least 55 years of age to be eligible for any benefits and had to be 65 years of age to
qualify for 100% of the DCP benefits.

1

Indeed, all defined benefit plans are "frozen" in the sense that they provide defined benefits to
eligible employees at retirement and the defined benefits rarely change over time. The
Respondent's own expert, Roger Smith, testified that defined benefit plans provide benefits that
"remains relatively constant over a period of years." (Transcript, p. 220-221).
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In the case at hand, the Respondent was only 46 years of age when he married the
Petitioner. In order to receive any percentage of the DCP benefits, he had to work nine
(9) additional service years and those nine service years occurred during the marriage
between the parties. In addition, the Respondent would not have qualified for the DCP
but for the enhancement of two Active years offered him by PacifiCorp's WFTP in the
year 2000, during the parties' marriage. (See explanation of WFTP at page 11-12 of
Appellant's Brief on Appeal). The Respondent's efforts to escape the plain language of
the plan, and to ignore the fact the Respondent had to remain employed in order to
qualify for benefits, is disingenuous.
There is no question that the trial court correctly ruled on the issue involving the
DCP. The DCP was not an entirely premarital asset. It was appropriate for the trial court
to find, as it in ^f 31 of its Findings that "the parties work together during the years of
marriage allowed Mr. Oliekan to retire, and respondent was required to be an employee
on the date of retirement in order to qualify for the benefit." The trial court's ruling
should not be disturbed. However, the trial court was wrong to characterize its ruling as
an "equitable adjustment" implying that the trial court was compensating for a flaw in the
Smith Model, or that it awarded the Petitioner more than what she was otherwise entitled
to receive. In that respect, the trial court's ruling was illusory.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COURT'S DECISION REGARDING
THE TEMPORARY ORDER WAS CORRECT BUT ILLUSORY.
The trial court's second "equitable adjustment" involved the Temporary Order.
On February 4, 2003, two years prior to trial, the trial court entered a Temporary Order.
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(Addendum F to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). The trial court ordered that each party be
responsible for their own debts and obligations arising after their separation on December
15, 2002. Paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order provided, "Each party is restrained and
enjoined from selling, gifting, transferring, alienating, pledging, or otherwise disposing of
the parties' marital assets." There was no dispute below, nor is there any on appeal, that
the IRA accounts were marital assets.
Notwithstanding the clear and unmistakable language of the restraining order
contained in the Temporary Order, the Respondent continued to use the parties' IRA
accounts as his own personal piggy bank. Not only did the Respondent continue to take
withdrawals from the IRAs in the amount of $2,100.00 each month, he took other
withdrawals totaling $59,922.89 to pay his own attorney (Transcript, p. 476, 522), make
loans to his girlfriend (Transcript, p. 522), and to otherwise live a lavish lifestyle of
traveling, etc., while, at the same time, having earned annual income from his job in
excess of $60,000.00. (Transcript, p. 517-519 and Trial Exhibit D-17). The undisputed
evidence at trial below was the Petitioner was unaware of any of the Respondent's postTemporary-Order withdrawals until shortly before trial when they were disclosed.
(Transcript, p. 359, 363). And, it was undisputed at trial below that the Respondent never
advised the Petitioner of the post-Temporary-Order withdrawals. (Transcript, p. 519).
At trial, the Petitioner claimed that the withdrawals clearly violated the
Temporary Order and were wrongful withdrawals under Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907
(Ut. App. 1988)(withdrawals in violation of a temporary order must be restored by the
errant party). Despite its plain language, the Respondent argued that the Temporary
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Order "contemplated" the withdrawals. (Transcript, p. 757). While the trial court
rejected the Respondent's argument, the trial court did so by indicating its ruling was an
equitable adjustment, again implying that it was compensating for a flaw in the Smith
Model, or that the Petitioner was getting more than what she was entitled. (Transcript, p.
770). While the trial court's legal ruling was correct, its implication that it was somehow
compensating for defects, or that the Plaintiff got more than what was correct, was wrong
and illusory.
Now, for the first time on appeal, the Respondent claims that the trial court's
ruling "was necessarily based on an implicit finding of contempt" and claims the trial
court erred by not requiring clear and convincing evidence that a valid order existed, that
the Respondent knew of the order, and that he disobeyed the order. (Brief of
Respondent/Cross-Appellant, p. 35). This was never argued before the trial court and
Appellant objects to it being raised for the first time on appeal. The Respondent should
not now be allowed to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, where it was never
considered by the trial court. Burleigh v. Turner, 388 P.2d 412 (Ut. 1964) and JarmiUo v.
Turner, 465 P.2d 343 (Ut. 1970).
In any event, and without waiving her objection, the evidence before the trial
court clearly and convincingly showed that the Respondent was culpable of contempt.
He was aware of the Temporary Order. He and his attorney were present when the Order
was entered by the Court and the Respondent's own attorney approved the Temporary
Order as to form. (Addendum F to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). The Respondent
admitted he did not seek permission from the Court to make the withdrawals (Transcript,

15

p. 507). With over $60,000.00 in earned income, the Respondent clearly had the ability
to abide by the Court's Temporary Order and there was no excuse to use the IRA
accounts as his own piggy bank. (Transcript, p. 517-519 and Trial Exhibit D-17). With
these undisputed facts, the trial court was within its discretion to order that the
Respondent make whole the defalcated accounts.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD WAS
APPROPRIATE AND NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
This Court should review the trial court's alimony award for abuse of discretion.
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153, 154-155 (Ut. App. 2003) and Davis v. Davis,
76 P.3d 716, 718 (Ut. App. 2003). "'Trial courts have considerable discretion in
determining alimony.. .and [determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.'" Davis, supra, quoting
Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Ut. App. 1995).
The Respondent does not claim that the trial court failed to consider the
appropriate factors enunciated by Bakanowski, supra, such as financial needs, ability to
pay, etc. Indeed, the Respondent does not challenge the trial court's factual findings
relative to alimony at all. (See Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, p. 36). And, the
Respondent does not marshal the evidence, as required by Burge v. Facio, 88 P.3d 350,
352 (Ut. App. 2004) to demonstrate why the trial court's ruling regarding alimony
resulted in "such a serious inequity... as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Bakanowski, supra.
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Instead, the Respondent again raises two arguments that were never presented to
the trial court. And, again, the Respondent objects to them being raised new on appeal.
Without waiving the concerns relative to the standard of review discussed above,
and without waving the Petitioner's objections to new arguments on appeal, the Petitioner
submits that the two arguments raised by the Respondent lack merit. The first argument
is that the Petitioner's standard of living didn't change and therefore no alimony should
be awarded. Again, the Respondent did not marshal the facts. While admitting the
Petitioner lost the equity to her own premarital home in the amount of $7,000.00, the
Respondent fails to point out that the Petitioner must now live on one limited income
alone, was forced to find new housing because of the court-ordered sale of the parties'
residence, and could not enjoy vacations as she did while married to the Respondent.
The Respondent also fails to point out that the trial court improperly deducted from
Respondent's income the debt of Debtscape which was entirely the Respondent's debt
post-separation that he voluntarily incurred himself. (Findings of Fact, f 63). The
Respondent also fails to point out that he engaged in an improper relationship with
another woman causing the parties' marriage to disintegrate. (Id., If 64).
The Respondent's second argument, that the trial court's treatment of the
Respondent's $2,100.00 income was inconsistent, again was never presented to the trial
court. Notwithstanding, the claim that the treatment of income was inconsistently treated
by the trial court is factually and legally incorrect. What the Respondent fails to consider
is that the trial court enjoined him from taking withdrawals from the parties' IRA
accounts pending trial. Therefore, the trial court was correct in treating the $2,100.00 as

17

wrongful withdrawals prior to trial and as income of $2,100.00 after the trial when the
injunction no longer applied.
The Respondent has not shown such a clear abuse of discretion so that a manifest
injustice occurred. This Court should affirm the alimony award.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY INCLUDING THE LENOX
COLLECTION IN THE MARITAL ESTATE.
The Respondent does not make the Lenox Collection issue a significant issue on
appeal. The reason is because the point has little merit in light of the standard of review.
"In order to revise the trial court's distribution of property in a divorce action, we must
find that it 'works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of
discretion.'" Burge v. Facio, 88 P.3d 350, 352 (Ut. App. 2004) quoting Gibbons v.
Gibbons, 656 P.2d 407, 409 (Ut. 1982). "[I]n exercising their discretion in divorce
actions, trial courts 'need be guided by the general purpose to be achieved by a property
division, which is to allocate the property in a manner which bet serves the needs of the
parties and best permits them to pursue their respective lives.'" Id., quoting Peterson v.
Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 594 (Ut. App. 1988). And, to challenge a trial court's finding of
fact, "[t]he challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which
tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous."
Id.
In this case, the Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence concerning the
property division and demonstrate that that the trial court's division of the marital estate
was clearly abusive. Instead, the Respondent attempts to single out one property element
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and claim that it was erroneously included in the marital estate. This is an improper
argument and should be rejected on its face.
Without waiving the objections noted above, the Petitioner points out that the
Respondent failed to cite to record testimony that suggested the Lenox collection was not
entirely premarital. For example, over two-thirds were purchased during the marriage for
the parties. (Transcript, p. 726 and Trial Exhibit P-49). Further, for example, the
Petitioner testified that the only Lenox items purchased for Respondent's mother were the
bird items. (Transcript, p. 389). While they were gifts to the Respondent's mother, they
were purchased by the Petitioner and Respondent together using marital funds.
(Transcript, p. 727). The items were returned to the Petitioner and Respondent following
the death of Respondent's mother. (Transcript, p. 412). Even if one were to isolate the
Lenox collection from the overall distribution of the marital estate, the Court's finding in
Paragraph 55 that the Lenox collection was entirely marital was not such a manifest
abuse of discretion so as to operate an inequity. This is particularly true where it was the
Respondent's burden of proof to demonstrate the Lenox collection was entirely
premarital property.
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES, THOUGH INADEQUATE, WAS NOT
CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The decision to award attorney's fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in
the sound discretion of the trial court; however, the trial court must base the award on
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and
the reasonableness of the requested fees. Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005, 101019

1011 (Ut. App. 2001). In this case, the trial court based its award on the Shinkoskey
factors.2 (See Findings, f 60-64, and 65-69). On appeal, the Respondent does not contest
the reasonableness of the fees, only whether it was based upon need and the ability to
pay.
Below, the evidence showed that the Petitioner had limited ability to pay any
attorney's fees while the case progressed to trial. Even though her attorney's fees
exceeded $20,194.00 through the fourth day of trial (Finding, ^ 65 and Transcript, p.
353), she was only able to make token payments toward her attorney's fee bill.
(Transcript, p. 418). Yet, at the same time, the Respondent violated the Temporary Order
in this case and made withdrawals from the parties' IRA accounts to maintain his lavish
lifestyle and, at the same time, pay his own attorney significant sums including $5,200.00
for a retainer (Transcript, p. 476)3 and an additional $2,507.00 as trial approached. (Trial
Exhibit 3, Exhibit 7; Addendum E to Appellant's Brief on Appeal).
In addition, the Court considered the fact that the Respondent had large
unexplained deposits to his checking account that did not coincide with his testimony
regarding monthly income. (Transcript, p. 683-691). Among these deposits were
deposits of $8,000.00 (Transcript, p. 683), $2,790.00 (Transcript, p. 685), $6,700.00
(Transcript, p. 686), $1,188.49, and $4,858.00 (Transcript, p. 689) all occurring in the
spring of 2004.

2

It is noteworthy that the Respondent drafted the Findings for the Court and there was no
discussion below that the Findings, relative to attorney's fees, were inadequate.
3
Compared to Petitioner's retainer of $150.00. (Transcript, p. 418).
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Below, the trial court found that the Petitioner had net income of $2,107.83 per
month with $2,531.68 in monthly expenses. (Findings, ^f 60 and 62). It found that she
had limited ability to earn income. (Finding, ^ 68). On the other hand, the Respondent
had net income of $4,863.33 per month with $4,426.39 in expenses. (Findings, ^f 61 and
63). And, as a consultant for PacifiCorp, he had a greater ability to earn income.
(Findings, *(\ 6 and 68). And, although the trial court noted and "struggled" with the fact
that the Respondent had voluntarily ran up his post-separation debt4 of over $600.00 a
month that he used to maintain his lavish lifestyle, the Court nevertheless included the
debt in his expenses. (Finding, ^ 63).
In addition to the Respondent's monthly income, the Court also considered that
the Respondent had large retirement assets whereas the Petitioner had limited retirement
assets. (Finding, ]f 68). It was proper for the trial court to cite to the disparity in these
retirement assets, and the need for the Petitioner to preserve her limited retirement assets,
while awarding attorney's fees. See Bakanowski supra, where court approved
consideration of preservation of a retirement account in the context of an alimony award.
Therefore, the trial court properly considered the Petitioner's need and the
Respondent's ability to pay. Shinkoskey, supra. The Respondent does not contest the
reasonableness of the fees.
Even assuming the trial court's findings regarding attorney's fees were too sparse,
the remedy would be to remand to the trial court for appropriate findings, and, if fees

4

The "Debtscape" debt.
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remained appropriate, to additionally award attorney's fees to the Petitioner for her
appeal if she is successful in this appeal. Shinkoskey, supra, p. 1011.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the trial court's adoption of a new theory
to divide retirement accounts was clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion, and
manifestly unjust. Instead of awarding her an equitable amount of the contributions and
growth earned during the marital years as required by Dunn and Englert, the trial court
adopted a flawed coverture fraction to spread out the contributions and earnings over a
31.90 year period effectively depriving the Petitioner of $156,707.58 that should have
been awarded to her. One can imagine the impact on valuing and dividing IRA accounts,
401k accounts and similar accrued accounts by trial courts in the future, if the lower
court's new theory is allowed to stand. It would eliminate a spouse's right to receive
contributions, and earnings on those contributions, made during the marriage.
While the trial court's legal decisions regarding the DCP and Temporary Orders
were correct, they were illusory in suggesting she received anything more than what she
was otherwise entitled by the rulings.
The trial court's division of the parties' personal property was not an abuse of
discretion, nor was its award of alimony. While the trial court's decision to award
attorney's fee was not clearly erroneous, the trial court's limited award of attorney's fees
was clearly erroneous. If successful on appeal, this Court should remand to the trial court
for an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
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Dated this

( 1 day of January, 2006.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says:
That he is the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner herein; and that he served the attached
APPELLANT'S SECOND BRIEF ON APPEAL (Reply and Answering Brief) upon:
Rodney R. Parker
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the same, sealed,
with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah,
on the // day of January, 2006.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \ \ day of January, 2006.
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